These are the settings that I use to harden ssh on my servers and clients.

Basic server configuration

There are a few basic things that most admins will already know (and that tiger will warn you about if you forget):

disable root logins
disable password authentication

If you are using rkhunter, you will need to disable the check for root logins since rkhunter doesn't check non-default config files. This is what I put in /etc/rkhunter.conf.local:

ALLOW_SSH_ROOT_USER=unset

This is what my /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/local.conf contains:

AuthorizedKeysFile  .ssh/authorized_keys

AcceptEnv LANG LC_* TZ

HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key

KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,curve25519-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com

AuthenticationMethods publickey

LogLevel VERBOSE

PermitRootLogin no

in order to also prevent the use of problematic or weak cryptographic algorithms.

Once you've done that, make sure you have all of the required host keys by running:

ssh-keygen -A

as root.

The above configuration is based on the Mozilla recommendations and then tightened up using the ssh-audit package.

While Mozilla recommends disabling short Diffie-Hellman moduli:

awk '$5 >= 3071' /etc/ssh/moduli > /etc/ssh/moduli.tmp
mv /etc/ssh/moduli.tmp /etc/ssh/moduli

that ends up being very annoying since it causes merge conflicts on distro upgrades.

Finally, if you don't need sftp support, Mozilla recommends disabling it, which can be done by commenting out this line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config:

#Subsystem     sftp    /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server

On the other hand, if you do need it, it's generally better to replace it with the internal sftp server:

Subsystem     sftp    internal-sftp

Whitelist approach to giving users ssh access

To ensure that only a few users have ssh access to the server and that newly created users don't have it enabled by default, create a new group:

addgroup sshuser

and then add the relevant users to it:

adduser francois sshuser

Finally, add this to /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/local.conf:

AllowGroups sshuser

Deterring brute-force (or dictionary) attacks

One way to ban attackers who try to brute-force your ssh server is to install the fail2ban package. It keeps an eye on the ssh log file (/var/log/auth.log) and temporarily blocks IP addresses after a number of failed login attempts.

To prevent your own IP addresses from being blocked, add them to /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/local.conf:

[DEFAULT]
ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 1.2.3.4

Another approach is to hide the ssh service using Single-Packet Authentication. I have fwknop installed on some of my servers and use small wrapper scripts to connect to them.

Restricting shell access

For those users who only need an ssh account on the server in order to transfer files (using scp or rsync), it's a good idea to restrict their access further. I used to switch these users' shell (via chsh) to a restricted one like rssh, but that project has been abandoned.

I now use a different approach which consists of using an essentially empty chroot for these users and limiting them to internal-sftp by putting the following in /etc/ssh/sshd_config:

Match Group sftponly
  ForceCommand internal-sftp
  ChrootDirectory /mnt/data

creating a group:

adduser sftponly

and a base chroot directory:

mkdir -p /mnt/data/home

Note that the base directory, and each parent directory all the way to the root directory, must be owned by root:root (user and group) otherwise you'll see an unhelpful error message like this when you try to connect via sftp:

$ sftp user1@server.example
client_loop: send disconnect: Broken pipe

Then for each user, we need to do the following:

adduser user1 sftp-only
chsh user1 -s /bin/false
mkdir -p /mnt/data/home/user1
chown user1:user1 /mnt/data/home/user1
chmod 700 /mnt/data/home/user1

before restarting the ssh daemon:

systemctl restart sshd.service

Should one of these users attempt to connect via ssh instead of stp, they will see the following:

$ ssh user1@server.example
This service allows sftp connections only.
Connection to server.example closed.

Restricting authorized keys to certain IP addresses

In addition to listing all of the public keys that are allowed to log into a user account, the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file also allows (as the man page points out) a user to impose a number of restrictions.

Perhaps the most useful option is from which allows a user to restrict the IP addresses which can login using a specific key.

Here's what one of my authorized_keys looks like:

from="192.0.2.2" ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nz...zvCn bot@example

You may also want to include the restrict option to each entry since it will automatically disable powerful features.

Client configuration

Since servers can sometimes create outbound ssh connections, for example as part of an offsite backup, I tighten up the ssh client configuration on all of my machines by putting the following in /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/local.conf:

HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,curve25519-sha256,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr

again, based on the Mozilla recommendations modified according to the ssh-audit report.

Note that if you need to connect to Launchpad, you'll need to relax these settings in your ~/.ssh/config:

Host *.launchpad.net
    HostKeyAlgorithms rsa-sha2-512
    MACs hmac-sha2-512